NOTE
THE SHAREHOLDERS'
DERIVATIVE-CLAIM EXCEPTION TO
THE ATTORNEY-CLIENT PRIVILEGE
I
INTRODUCTION

Shareholders and corporate management participate in a relationship in
which management is normally the representative of the shareholders, but is
at times their adversary.' As representative, management needs the means to
protect the corporate interest. The attorney-client privilege traditionally has
2
been recognized as an important means of protecting that interest.
Shareholders want management to make full use of the privilege in defending
their interests against attacks from those outside the corporation. A fullfledged attorney-client privilege proves to be a double-edged sword, however,
when shareholders bring a derivative action.
When shareholders in a derivative suit seek to pierce the corporate
attorney-client privilege, courts are presented with three alternatives:
Copyright © 1985 by Law and Contemporary Problems
1. In litigation, the relationship between shareholders and management depends upon the
nature of the suit. Three types of actions can be brought: (1) direct actions by the corporation; (2)
direct actions by the shareholder; and (3) derivative actions. The clearest example of management
defending the shareholders' interests is a direct suit brought by the corporation based on a cause of
action that accrues in favor of the corporation against an outsider. In contrast, the clearest example
of shareholders and management as adversaries occurs when a shareholder (or class of shareholders)
brings a direct action against the corporation to enforce a cause of action belonging to the
shareholder as an individual for breach of the shareholder's membership contract. See H. HENN &J.
ALEXANDER, LAWS OF CORPORATIONS § 360, at 1044-45 (3d ed. 1983).

When a derivative action is brought, the relationship between shareholders and management is
more complex. The corporation occupies a dual position in the litigation. Because the corporation
has refused to sue in its own name, the shareholder is the nominal party plaintiff, while the
corporation is the real party plaintiff. In addition, the corporation is the nominal party defendant.
An adversary relationship between the shareholder-plaintiff and management exists in the derivative
suit regardless of whether the wrong to the corporation was allegedly perpetrated by management or
by persons outside the corporation. See id. § 358, at 1035-37. The adversary relationship is clearest
when management is the alleged wrongdoer; however, the adversary relationship also exists when
persons outside the corporation are the alleged wrongdoers, since the derivative suit, in effect,
alleges that management has wronged the shareholders by failing to assert the corporation's cause of
action in a direct action by the corporation against the outsiders. See id. § 358, at 1035; § 360, at
1044.
2. See infra notes 40-43, 59-62, & 64-68 and accompanying text. As this note argues, the
corporate interest is served by devices which furnish incentives for communications from clients to
counsel. The same rationale for the attorney-client privilege in the corporate context is stressed in
an article published after the body of this note was written. See Saltzburg, Corporate Attorney-Client
Privilege in Shareholder Litigation and Similar Cases: Garner Revisited, 12 HOFsTRA L. REV. 817 (1984).
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(1) granting the shareholders unrestricted access to confidential
communications; (2) treating the shareholders as outsiders to the corporation
for purposes of the privilege and allowing the privilege to be pierced only
pursuant to the common law exceptions; or (3) recognizing a derivative-claim
exception to the privilege whereby the shareholders can pierce the privilege
in circumstances in which an outsider would not be allowed to do so. The
danger of strike suits and other abuses of the derivative suit renders the first
to
confidential
communicationsalternative-unrestricted
access
unworkable. This note will analyze the choice between the second and third
alternatives: whether the shareholder should be treated as an outsider with
respect to the privilege or should be granted preferred status in piercing it.
Several courts have recognized a derivative-claim exception and allowed
shareholders to pierce the corporate attorney-client privilege. 3 This
exception was initially recognized by the Fifth Circuit in Garner v. Wolfinbarger.4
No other federal court of appeals has adopted the exception; however, district
courts outside the Fifth Circuit have recognized it. 5 No court has expressly
rejected the derivative-claim exception.
The derivative-claim exception has intuitive appeal. A derivative suit is
brought for the benefit of the corporation; the shareholders seek confidential
communications

to

vindicate

corporate

interests.

Moreover,

the

shareholders, not the managers, own the corporation, and, as owners, pay the
corporation's attorney fees. In addition, allowing managers to invoke the
privilege to keep confidential communications from shareholders seems
inconsistent with the duty of loyalty that management owes to shareholders.
This note argues (1) that the derivative-claim exception substantially
undermines the corporate attorney-client privilege; (2) that the underlying
rationale for the exception, and the benefits arising from it, do not justify
allowing shareholders to have special access to confidential communications

between management and corporate counsel; (3) that the exception is rarely,
3. In re LTV Sec. Litig., 89 F.R.D. 595, 606-11 (N.D. Tex. 1981) (class action brought by
shareholders; court recognized derivative-claim exception but refused to allow privilege to be
pierced); Ohio-Sealy Mattress Mfg. Co. v. Kaplan, 90 F.R.D. 21, 31-32 (N.D. Ill. 1980) (derivative suit
and class action; court recognized derivative-claim exception but refused to allow privilege to be
pierced); Panter v. Marshall Field & Co., 80 F.R.D. 718, 722 (N.D. IIl. 1978) (shareholder class
action; court recognized derivative-claim exception and allowed privilege to be pierced); Cohen v.
Uniroyal, Inc., 80 F.R.D. 480 (E.D. Pa. 1978) (securities fraud class action by shareholders; court
recognized derivative-claim exception and allowed privilege to be pierced); In re Transocean Tender
Offer Sec. Litig., 78 F.R.D. 692, 694-97 (N.D. 11. 1978) (derivative suit and shareholder class action;
court recognized derivative-claim exception and allowed privilege to be pierced); Broad v. Rockwell
95,894 (N.D. Tex. 1977)
Int'l Corp., [1976-1977 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH)
(debenture holders asserted securities law violation and breach of fiduciary duty against corporation;
court recognized derivative-claim exception and allowed privilege to be pierced); George v. LeBlanc,
78 F.R.D. 281, 289-90 (N.D. Tex. 1977) (derivative suit; court applied derivative-claim exception and
allowed privilege to be pierced); Valente v. Pepsico, Inc., 68 F.R.D. 361 (D. Del. 1975) (shareholder
class action; derivative-claim exception recognized and court allowed privilege to be pierced); Bailey
v. Meister Brau, Inc., 55 F.R.D. 211 (N.D. Ill. 1972) (shareholder in target corporation allowed to
pierce privilege of acquiring corporation).
4. 430 F.2d 1093 (5th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 974 (1971).
5. See supra note 3.
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if ever, needed since the attorney-client privilege does not protect underlying
facts, or place shareholders in a worse position than if management had never
sought legal advice; and (4) that recognition of the exception diverts attention
from the common law exceptions to the privilege and diffuses efforts to make
the common law exceptions more effective in preventing abuses of the
attorney-client privilege by management. The note first traces the
development of the exception. 6 After examining the purposes of the
attorney-client privilege, the note analyzes the corporate attorney-client
privilege in derivative suits and argues that the reasons supporting
recognition of a strong privilege when outsiders sue the corporation apply
with even greater force when shareholders bring a derivative suit. 7 The note
then examines the rationales underlying the exception 8 and the complexity of
the test used by courts in determining when to apply the exception, 9
concluding that an exception to the attorney-client privilege for shareholders
in derivative suits should not be recognized.

II
THE EMERGENCE AND DEVELOPMENT OF THE DERIVATIVE-CLAIM
EXCEPTION TO THE ATTORNEY-CLIENT PRIVILEGE

A.

The Emergence of the Derivative-Claim Exception

2
°
is the oldest'1 and most respected'
The attorney-client privilege
common law evidentiary privilege. Corporations are entitled to invoke the

6. See infra notes 14-33 and accompanying text.
7. See infra notes 34-72 and accompanying text.
8. See infra notes 73-121 and accompanying text.
9. See infra notes 122-202 and accompanying text.
10. Dean Wigmore has set forth the circumstances under which a communication falls within the
protection of the attorney-client privilege: (1) legal advice of any kind is sought; (2) the advice is
sought from a professional legal adviser in his capacity as such; (3) the communications relate to that
purpose; (4) the communications are made in confidence; (5) the communications are made by the
client; and (6) a waiver has not occurred. 8 J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 2292 (McNaughton rev. ed.
1961).
Most courts have adopted Wigmore's formulation of the attorney-client privilege. See, e.g., United
States v. Goldfarb, 328 F.2d 280, 281 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 377 U.S. 976 (1964); Radiant Burners,
Inc. v. American Gas Ass'n, 320 F.2d 314, 319 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 375 U.S. 929 (1963); see also S.
SALTZBURG

& K.

REDDEN,

FEDERAL RULES OF EVIDENCE MANUAL

234-35 (3d ed. 1982); Note, The

Attorney-Client Privilege and the Corporate Client. Where Do We Go After Upjohn?, 81 MicH. L. REV. 665,
666-67 (1981).
Saltzburg, supra note 2, at 818-24, argues that Wigmore too sweepingly criticized privileges,
leading to unwarranted judicial constriction. Saltzburg concludes, as does this note, that the
narrowing of the privilege in shareholder suits is misguided.
11. 8 J. WIGMORE, supra note 10, § 2290; see also Gergacz, Attorney-Client Privilege, 37 Bus. LAW.

461, 473 (1982) (suggesting that the privilege originated with the Romans); Radin, The Privilege of
Confidential Communication Between Lawyer and Client, 16 CALIF. L. REV. 487, 488 (1928). See generally
Hazard, An HistoricalPerspectiveon the Attorney-Client Privilege, 66 CALIF. L. REV 1061, 1069-70 (1978).
Originally, the attorney-client privilege protected the oath and honor of the attorney. 8 J.
WIGMORE, supra note 10, § 2290. Under the "oath and honor" justification of the privilege, the
privilege belonged to the attorney (who could waive it) and ended once the litigation had been
completed. The oath and honor justification of the privilege was rejected in England during the

eighteenth century and replaced by the theory that the privilege promoted justice by encouraging
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privilege against persons outside the corporation.' 3 Whether a corporation
can invoke the attorney-client privilege against its shareholders has been the
subject of few judicial decisions.' 4 Before 1968, there was only one reported
opinion on the subject, and the court, in upholding the privilege, attributed
no special significance to the fact that the party seeking to pierce the privilege
15
was a derivative-suit plaintiff.
The derivative-claim exception is the product of a single case, Garner v.
Wolfinbarger.16 Garner remains the leading decision and the key to
understanding the exception. Courts that have recognized the derivativeclaim exception have applied Garner without questioning its underlying
rationale and have assumed that the only issue is whether, on the facts of the
case, the shareholder is entitled to pierce the privilege under the standard
established in Garner.
full disclosure between client and attorney. Id. For a discussion of the modern rationale for the
privilege, see notes 42-43 and accompanying text.
12. See S. SALTZBURG & K. REDDEN, supra note 10, at 247 ("most widely respected common law
privilege").
13. Upjohn Co. v. United States, 449 U.S. 383, 390 (1981).
14. See supra note 3.
15. In Graham v. Allis-Chalmers Mfg. Co., 41 Del. Ch. 78, 88-89, 188 A.2d 125, 132 (1963), the
court refused to allow the corporation's attorney-client privilege to be pierced by the plaintiffshareholder who sought to obtain confidential communications made by the managers to the
corporate attorneys. In other contexts, however, two courts indicated a willingness to give
shareholders special access to confidential communications. In News Journal Corp. v. State ex rel.
Gore, 136 Fla. 620, 624, 187 So. 271, 272 (1939), the court stated in dictum that a shareholder could
gain access to confidential communications through the right of inspection if the shareholder could
show that the value of his shares was affected by the confidential communications. For a discussion
of the attorney-client privilege and the right of inspection, see infra notes 76-84 and accompanying
text.
In Pattie Lea, Inc. v. District Court, 161 Colo. 493, 498, 423 P.2d 27, 30 (1967), the court held
that the corporation could not assert a statutory accountant-client privilege against a shareholder
bringing a derivative suit. This case provides little, if any, support by way of analogy to the issue of
whether the shareholder should be allowed to pierce the corporate attorney-client privilege. A
statutory accountant-client privilege is qualitatively different from the common law attorney-client
privilege. The attorney-client privilege is recognized by all federal courts, while many federal courts
have refused to recognize a privilege between accountants and their clients. See, e.g., United States v.
Wainwright, 413 F.2d 796, 803 (10th Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 1009 (1970). Moreover,
statutory privileges are generally construed more strictly than common law evidentiary privileges.
See Burnham, The Attorney-Client Privilege in the CorporateArena, 24 Bus. LAw. 901, 912 n.27 (1969).
16. 430 F.2d 1093 (5th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 974 (1971). The derivative-claim
exception to the attorney-client privilege, though not referred to as such, was first articulated in
Garner. In Garner, shareholders brought a class action directly against the corporation and
derivatively against its officers, alleging common law fraud and violations of state and federal
securities laws. Id. at 1095. The shareholders sought to compel the corporation's attorney to
disclose advice he had given to the corporation prior to the filing of the derivative action. Id. at 1096.
The corporation objected on the grounds that the attorney-client privilege protected confidential
communications between management and the corporation's attorney. The district court held that
the privilege could not be asserted by the corporation against its shareholders.
On appeal, the Fifth Circuit vacated the district court's holding and held that when shareholders
bring suit against the corporation alleging that the corporation had acted inimically to shareholder
interests, the corporation's right to assert the privilege is subject to the right of the shareholder to
show cause why the corporation should not be allowed to invoke the privilege. Id. For a discussion
of the requirements for showing "cause" under Garner, see infra notes 17-20 and accompanying text.
A discussion of the rationale underlying the derivative-claim exception is infra at notes 73-121 and
accompanying text.
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To establish the derivative-claim exception to the attorney-client privilege,
the shareholder must show "good cause" why the corporation should not be
entitled to invoke the privilege.' 7 Garner set forth nine factors that may
contribute to a finding of the presence or absence of good cause:
the number of shareholders and the percentage of stock they
represent;
the bona fides of the shareholders;
the nature of the shareholders' claim and whether it is obviously
colorable;
the apparent necessity or desirability of the shareholders having the
information and the availability of it from other sources;
whether, if the shareholders' claim is of wrongful action by the
corporation, it is of action criminal, or illegal but not criminal, or of
doubtful legality;
whether the communication related to past or to prospective actions;
whether the communication is of advice concerning the litigation
itself;
the extent to which the communication is identified versus the extent
to which the shareholders are blindly fishing;
the risk of revelation of trade secrets or other information in whose
confidentiality the corporation has an interest for independent
reasons. 18

The court did not specify how much weight any of the factors should be given,
nor did it elaborate on their meaning. It left open the possibility that other
factors might later be discovered 1 9 and noted that both in camera inspections
and protective orders could be used to limit disclosure of the confidential
communications 20
In support of the derivative-claim exception, Garner analogized the
shareholders' attempt to pierce the privilege to the joint-client exception to
the privilege, 2 ' the crime-fraud exception to the privilege, 22 and the
shareholder's right of inspection. 2 3 In proposing the derivative-claim
exception, the court also relied on three aspects of the relationship between
management and shareholders: (1) the mutuality of interest between
shareholders and management in the use of confidential communications for
the benefit of the corporation; (2) the proprietary interest which shareholders
have in the corporate attorney's advice; and (3) the inconsistency of allowing
management to invoke the privilege to keep confidential communications
17.
18.
19.
20.
21.
22.
23.

Garner, 430 F.2d at 1103-04.
Id. at 1104.
See id.
Id.
See infra notes 85-91 and accompanying text.
See infra notes 92-99 and accompanying text.
See infra notes 76-84 and accompanying text.
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from shareholders in all cases with the fiduciary duty of loyalty that
management owes to the shareholders. 24 The derivative-claim exception
assumes that disclosure of confidential communications to shareholders will
not significantly discourage managers from seeking legal advice, encourage
the corporate attorney to hedge or soften the legal advice provided, or
25
undermine counsel's efforts to prompt corporate compliance with the law.

B.

The Development of the Derivative-Claim Exception

From its inception, the derivative-claim exception has provided minimal
predictability in determining when confidential communications between
management and corporate counsel will be protected. Initial optimism that
the nine factors set forth in Garner would provide lower courts with guidance,
and thereby foster greater certainty, was misplaced. Instead of evolving into a
predictable test, the opposite has occurred. Issues which appeared to be
resolved in Garner,26 such as which party bears the burden of proof, have
turned out to be open questions 2 7 for courts outside the Fifth Circuit, with
some courts placing the burden on the plaintiff-shareholder, 2 8 others placing
it on the corporation, 29 and one suggesting the burden shifts depending upon
which factors are at issue. 30 Similarly, fifteen years of application of the
derivative-claim exception have not eliminated the substantial uncertainty
surrounding (1) how the factors should be applied, 3 (2) how much weight
should be given to each factor, 3 2 and (3) when the exception will be
recognized. 33 In combination, these unresolved issues introduce substantial

uncertainty about when confidential communications between management
and corporate counsel will be protected. This uncertainty, in turn, chills
communications between management and corporate attorneys, making it
less likely that corporate counsel will be able to prompt corporate compliance
with the law.
The fifteen years since Garner have been characterized by judicial
reluctance to question the underlying rationale of the derivative-claim
24. See Garner,430 F.2d at 1101-02. For a discussion of these rationales, see infra notes 100-21
and accompanying text.
25. See Garner, 430 F.2d at 1102. For a discussion of this point, see infra notes 34-72 and
accompanying text.
26. Garner placed the burden of proving "good cause" to pierce the privilege on the
shareholder. 430 F.2d at 1103-04 (the corporation can invoke the privilege "subject to the right of
the stockholders to show cause why it should not be invoked in the particular instance").
27. See In re Transocean Tender Offer Sec. Litig., 78 F.R.D. 692, 695-96 (N.D. Ill. 1978) (noting
contradictory precedents and choosing to leave the question open).
28. See, e.g., Quintel Co. v. Citibank, 567 F. Supp. 1357, 1363 (S.D.N.Y. 1983); Ohio-Sealy
Mattress Mfg. Co. v. Kaplan, 90 F.R.D. 21, 31 (N.D. Ill. 1980).
29. See Valente v. Pepsico, Inc., 68 F.R.D. 361, 367 (D. Del. 1975) ("the corporation is not
entitled to claim the privilege as against its own shareholders, absent some special cause").
30. See, e.g., Panter v. Marshall Field & Co., 80 F.R.D. 718, 723 (N.D. Ill. 1978) ("no argument
has been made that the information contained in these documents is available to the plaintiffs from
other sources").
31. See infra notes 139-41 and accompanying text.
32. See infra notes 142-45 and accompanying text.
33. See infra notes 130-38 and accompanying text.
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exception. Courts other than the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit have
adopted the exception without questioning whether (1) a mutuality of interest
actually exists between management and the shareholders as to the use of
confidential communications in derivative suits, (2) shareholders have a
proprietary interest in the corporate counsel's advice to management, (3)
allowing management to invoke the privilege is inconsistent with the fiduciary
duty of loyalty that management owes the shareholders, (4) the exception will
encourage corporate counsel to hedge or soften legal advice provided, or (5)
the exception will undermine counsel's efforts to prompt corporate
compliance with the law. Moreover, courts adopting the derivative-claim
exception have failed to consider the counterproductive effect the exception
has had on the development of common law limitations on the misuse of the
privilege-the derivative-claim exception diverts attention from efforts to
modify the joint-client and crime-fraud exceptions to the privilege.
III
THE CORPORATE ATrORNEY-CLIENT PRIVILEGE IN

DERIVATIVE SUITS

The purpose of the attorney-client privilege is "to encourage full and frank
communication between attorneys and clients and thereby promote broader
public interest in the observance of law and administration of justice." 3 4 To
fulfill its purpose, the attorney-client privilege must serve three functions: (1)
encourage full and frank disclosure of information to the attorney; (2) protect
the advice given by the attorney to the client; and (3) promote compliance
35
with the law.

The Federal Rules of Evidence do not prohibit federal courts from
recognizing new exceptions to the attorney-client privilege; however, any
exception to the privilege must be consistent with "the principles of the
common law as they may be interpreted by the courts of the United States in
light of reason and experience." 3 6 The derivative-claim exception is
inconsistent with the purpose of the attorney-client privilege and the
"principles of the common law" which undergird the privilege because the
exception (1) discourages full and frank communication of information from
management to the corporate attorney, 37 (2) adversely affects the quality of
advice corporate counsel provides management, 38 and (3) hinders corporate
counsel's efforts to ensure that management complies with the complex
39
regulatory scheme confronting the corporation.

34.
35.
36.
37.
38.
39.

Upjohn Co. v. United States, 449 U.S. 383, 389 (1981).
See id. at 390-92.
FED. R. EvID. 501.
See infra notes 40-58 and accompanying text.
See infra notes 59-63 and accompanying text.
See infra notes 64-72 and accompanying text.
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The Derivative-Claim Exception Discourages Full and Frank Disclosure
of Information to the Corporate Attorney

In resolving any legal problem, the lawyer's first step is to learn all of the
facts. 40 This task is made difficult by the tendency of clients to omit facts that
the client views as adverse or unimportant. 4 1 Often the client's evaluation of
the facts is incorrect; facts that the client views as adverse may turn out to be
harmless, or even favorable, while facts that the client views as unimportant
may turn out to be crucial.
Encouraging full and frank disclosure of facts to the attorney is one of the
functions of the attorney-client privilege. 42 The theory underlying this
function of the privilege goes to the heart of the adversary system of justice:
justice is promoted when each party is represented by an effective advocate; a
lawyer can only be effective if he knows all of the facts; and a client will make a
full and frank disclosure of facts to the attorney only under a guarantee of
43
confidentiality.
While the relationship between the scope of the privilege and the
willingness of the client to disclose information to the attorney has not been
empirically verified, 4 4 the Supreme Court has assumed that a direct
relationship exists between the privilege's scope and the client's willingness to
make full and frank disclosure. 4 5 The Court has not engaged in a context-bycontext balancing 46 of the costs of the privilege against the incremental
increase in disclosure of information to the attorney. The broad, protective
rule that the Court has adopted for determining the scope of the attorneyclient privilege reflects the great weight the common law has given to the
privilege and suggests that the Court would not consider the scope of the
40. See Upjohn Co. v. United States, 449 U.S. 383, 390-91 (1981).
41. See C. MCCORMICK, MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE § 87, at 205 (3d ed. 1984).
42. Upjohn Co. v. United States, 449 U.S. 383, 389 (1981).
43. See id.
44. The only empirical study of the relationship between the scope of the privilege and the
willingness of the client to disclose information to the attorney produced inconclusive results. See
Note, Functional Overlap Between the Lawyer and Other Professionals: Its Implications for the Privileged
Communications Doctrine, 71 YALE L.J. 1226, 1262 (1968) (55 of 108 laymen would be less willing to
provide information if the privilege were abolished, 37 would not be less willing, and 16 did not
know); see also Sexton, A Post-Upjohn Considerationof the Corporate Attorney-Client Privilege, 57 N.Y.U. L.
REV. 443, 473 n.115 (1982).
45. See Sexton, supra note 44, at 474 n.l 16 ("The intensity with which the Court holds this
intuition [that a relationship exists between the scope of the privilege and the willingness of the client
to disclose information to the attorney] cannot be doubted."). "Unless such evidence [showing that
the flow of information to the attorney does not increase with the protection of the privilege] is
available, however, the development of doctrine regarding the corporate privilege will be heavily
influenced by the Court's belief that the privilege produces an increment in the information available
to attorneys." Id. at 474.
46. In other areas of the law, the Court has engaged in a context-by-context balancing of the
costs and benefits of extending a protective rule. For example, when the Court is considering
whether to extend the exclusionary rule to a new context, it weighs the costs and benefits of the
extension. The fact that the Court does not engage in a context-by-context weighing of the costs and
benefits of the attorney-client privilege reflects the strength of the common law assumption that
there is a direct relationship between the scope of the privilege and the client's willingness to disclose
information to the attorney.
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privilege to be narrower in derivative suits than in actions brought by
outsiders against the corporation. Moreover, even if the Court were to weigh
the costs of the privilege against the incremental increase in disclosure of
information to the attorney, the threat of strike suits and other abuses of the
derivative suit suggests that even greater assurances of confidentiality are
needed in derivative suits.
The derivative-claim exception to the attorney-client privilege discourages
the communication of factual information to the attorney. Faced with the
threat of disclosure, managers will be less willing to provide the attorney with
all of the facts. The threat of disclosure to shareholders in a derivative suit is
no less chilling on communications with the attorney than is the threat of
disclosure to outsiders because in both cases managers face the possibility of
personal liability and other undesirable consequences arising from
47
litigation.
Management may fear derivative suits more than actions brought by
outsiders. Derivative liability has traditionally been recognized as
encouraging many useless suits designed to enrich the plaintiff-shareholder 4 8
or the plaintiff's attorney. 49 While legislatures have attempted to prevent
abuses of derivative suits, 50 the danger of such abuse still exists. As a result,

when managers foresee the possibility of a derivative action arising from a
particular transaction, they may be inclined to disclose even less of the factual
background to the corporate attorney than if the transaction were susceptible
to attack only by those outside the corporation.
The substantial incentive to settle derivative suits, coupled with the threat
of the use of the derivative-claim exception to pierce the privilege, point to a
need for even greater protection of communications from managers to
corporate counsel. The fee-setting mechanism in derivative litigation
provides an incentive to bring actions primarily for the purpose of obtaining a
settlement. 5' The derivative-claim exception intensifies the already existing
47. The manager's eligibility for indemnification or entitlement to liability insurance may
depend on how the suit is resolved. See H. HENN &J. ALEXANDER, supra note 1, § 380, at 1125-28
(discussing eligibility of managers to receive indemnification); id. § 381, at 1144-46 (discussing
entitlement to liability insurance).
48. See id. § 358, at 1039.
49. See id. at n.22.
50. See generally Cox, Searching for the Corporation's Voice in Derivative Suit Litigation: A Critique of
Zapata and the ALl Project, 1982 DUKE L.J. 959, 959-60 (noting that the derivative suit has survived the
adoption of security-for-expenses and indemnification statutes).
51. See, e.g., Conard, Winnowing Derivative Suits Through Attorneys Fees, LAw & CONTEMP. PROBS.,
Winter 1984, at 269, 270 nA (noting that for the following reasons the corporate defendant has a
strong incentive to settle a derivative suit even when there is a good chance that the plaintiff will not
prevail on the merits: (1) the cost of settlement is usually less than the litigation costs of continuing
the suit; (2) under indemnification laws of many states, the managers can be indemnified for
litigation expenses when the suit is settled, but not when the managers are adjudged liable; and (3)
the continuation of the suit exposes management to unfavorable publicity); Jones, An Empirical
Examination of the Resolution of Shareholder Derivative and Class Action Lawsuits, 60 B.U.L. REv. 542, 54447 (1980) (study of 348 shareholder derivative and class action suits found that 70% settled, while
plaintiff success rate in cases where a court entered a final judgment was only 2.3%; author suggests
that defendants settle unless there is a high probability of winning at trial).
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pro-plaintiff settlement bias. One commentator has suggested that the
52
derivative-claim exception be used to "shock" management into settling.
While management may be "shocked" into settlement once, it will take steps
not to be placed in that position again. The easiest way to avoid an
unfavorable settlement position would be to provide only a "sanitized"
version of the facts to the corporate attorney. A "sanitized" version of the
facts might be suitable for presentation at trial, but would not provide the full
factual background that the attorney needs to provide legal advice.
The threat of derivative litigation does not provide management with
sufficient incentive for full disclosure to corporate counsel. In United States v.
Upjohn, 53 the Court rejected the argument that the threat of civil or criminal
liability provides managers with a sufficient incentive to make full disclosure
to corporate counsel even when their communications with counsel are not
protected.54 The Court noted that such an argument proves too much
because it would apply with equal force to the individual, and the common law
has "recognized the value of the privilege in further facilitating
communications." 5 5 Similarly, the fact that disclosure would be for the
"benefit of the corporation," or that other incentives may prompt disclosure,
would also prove too much if it were argued that the threat of a derivative suit
provided sufficient incentive for full disclosure to the attorney when those
communications could later be presented in court under the derivative-claim
exception.
Moreover, the derivative-claim exception is not needed in shareholder
litigation since the attorney-client privilege does not protect facts from being
discovered; the privilege only prevents discovery through the attorney. 5 6
Shareholders in a derivative suit will not be prevented from discovering facts
from the managers. The privilege protects only communications made to the
attorney. The privilege, when applied to confidential communications
between the managers and the corporate attorney, places the shareholder in
57
no worse a position than if the communication had never been made.
Considerations of convenience do not justify an exception to the attorneyclient privilege. 58
B.

The Derivative-Claim Exception Fails to Protect Adequately the Advice
Given by the Attorney to the Client

In addition to facilitating the communication of facts by the client to the
attorney, the attorney-client privilege exists to protect the giving of legal
52. See O'Neal & Thompson, Vulnerability of Professional-ClientPrivilege in Shareholder Litigation, 31
Bus. LAw. 1775, 1775 (1976).
53. 449 U.S. 383 (1981).
54. Id. at 393 n.2.
55. Id.
56. See id.at 395 ("The privilege only protects disclosure of communications; it does not protect
disclosure of the underlying facts by those who communicated with the attorney").
57. See id.
58. See id.at 396.
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advice to the client. 5 9 The justification underlying this second function of the
privilege is two-fold. First, extending the privilege to protect the advice given
by the attorney is inextricably linked to the protection of the client's
disclosure of facts to the attorney:

protection of communications to the

attorney would be rendered nugatory if the attorney's advice could be
introduced at trial to show circumstantially the facts upon which the advice
was based. 60 Therefore, the reasons that support protecting disclosure of
confidential communications from the client to the attorney 6 ' also support the
protection of communications from the attorney to the client.
The second justification is also based on the direct relationship between
the scope of the privilege's protection and the quality of advice the attorney
provides the client. In Upjohn, the Court emphasized that if the protection of
the privilege was not available, "the depth and quality of the investigations [by
corporate counsel] to ensure compliance with the law would suffer."

62

Since

the depth and quality of corporate counsel's investigations are directly related
to the protection afforded by the privilege, the quality of advice provided to
management would also be affected by the scope of the privilege's protection.
The derivative-claim exception, with its substantial threat of disclosure, will
prompt the corporate attorney to hedge his advice or shape it in anticipation
63
that the advice may be discoverable in subsequent shareholder litigation. If
the corporate attorney knows that his advice to management is protected and
management wants to do something that is arguably illegal, the attorney
serves the corporate interest by counselling that the proposed action should
not be taken. But if the attorney knows that his advice will be played back at
trial, the attorney may choose to waffle, since that best serves management's
interests.
C.

The Derivative-Claim Exception Hinders Corporate Counsel's Efforts
to Ensure Corporate Compliance with the Law

In addition to encouraging management to make full and frank disclosure
to corporate counsel and protecting counsel's advice to the client, the
corporate attorney-client privilege promotes "the valuable efforts of
corporate counsel to ensure their client's compliance with the law."

64

In

Upjohn, the Court emphasized "the vast and complicated array of regulatory
legislation confronting the modern corporation," 6 5 the difficulty in
distinguishing economically justifiable business conduct from behavior
59.
60.
61.

See id. at 390.
See C. MCCORMICK, supra note 41, § 89, at 212.
See supra notes 40-58 and accompanying text.

62.

449 U.S. 383, 393 n.2.

63. One corporate attorney, in describing how the derivative-claim exception affected his
practice, wrote tongue (presumably) only half in cheek: "[Tihe best rule is the rule of preventive
medicine. Do not write very much. Keep all your notes on a pad that says at the top, 'Ladies and
gentlemen of the jury.' " Ward, The Attorney-Client Privilege: A Litigators Perspective, 6 DEL. J. CORP. L.
447, 452 (1981).
64. Upjohn Co. v. United States, 449 U.S. 383, 392 (1981).
65. Id.
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proscribed by antitrust laws, 66 and the corporation's great need for legal
advice. The Court, however, rejected the argument that because of the
corporation's great need for legal advice, management would seek legal
advice even if substantial uncertainty existed as to whether the privilege was
available. 67 The Court emphasized that corporate counsel's efforts to make
internal investigations to ensure compliance with the law would be
68
impermissibly impaired if the protection of the privilege were not available.
The derivative-claim exception undermines corporate counsel's efforts to
ensure compliance with the law. The exception discourages management
from making full and frank disclosure to counsel, 69 thereby screening
information from the corporate attorney that is needed to ensure such
compliance. Similarly, the exception prompts counsel to soften or hedge
advice to management in anticipation that the advice will later be
discoverable.7 0 In addition, the threat of disclosure posed by the derivativeclaim exception discourages corporate counsel's efforts to make extensive
investigations of corporate activities to ensure corporate compliance with the
law. As a result, the derivative-claim exception, which purports 7 1 to enhance
the role the derivative suit plays in encouraging corporate compliance with
the law, threatens to displace the primary means of ensuring such compliance:
72
counsel's ongoing advice to management.
IV
JUSTIFICATIONS FOR CARVING OUT A DERIVATIVE-CLAIM EXCEPTION

When Congress enacted Federal Rule of Evidence 501, it chose not to
freeze the law of evidentiary privileges, but rather to allow the federal courts
to continue to develop the decisional law. 73 Accordingly, federal courts have
the authority to carve out exceptions to the attorney-client privilege as long as
66. See id.
67. See id. at 393 n.2.
68. See id.
69. See supra notes 40-58 and accompanying text. Similarly, Saltzburg, supra note 2, at 832,
criticizes Garner for failing to mention the incentive for communications which lies at the heart of the
attorney-client privilege.
70. See supra notes 59-63 and accompanying text.
71. For a discussion of reasons why the derivative-claim exception is not needed by
shareholders in a derivative suit, see supra notes 56-58 and accompanying text.
72. See Burnham, The Attorney-Client Privilege in the Corporate Arena, 24 Bus. LAw. 901, 914 (1969)
("[S]ecurities law [both federal and state] . . . and antitrust laws of all kinds . . . are areas of
corporate law where there would seem to be an immense social benefit deriving from free
interchange between corporations and their attorneys about how one should comply with the law.
Without this level of primary enforcement by lawyers, these areas of the law in the modern context
would be virtually unmanageable."); Miller, The Challenges to the Attorney-Client Privilege, 49 VA. L. REv.
262, 268 n.25 (1963) (" 'Far more violations of the antitrust laws are probably prevented by
competent advice given by legal counsel to corporate and individual clients than by prosecutions by
the Department ofJustice or by the Federal Trade Commission.' ") (quoting from a letter written by
the Chairman of the Administrative Law Section of the District of Columbia Bar Association);
Shenefield, Compliance Programs as Viewed from the Antitrust Division, 48 ANTITRUST L.J. 73, 73 (1979)
("the private bar is the front line of antitrust enforcement").
73. See Upjohn Co. v. United States, 449 U.S. 383, 396 (1981).
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any exception is consistent with the "principles of the common law."

74

In
justifying the derivative-claim exception to the attorney-client privilege,
Garner relied on the fiduciary relationship that exists between management
and shareholders, and referred by analogy to the joint-client and crime-fraud
exceptions as well as to the right of inspection. 75 An examination of each of
these bases, with the latter considered first, suggests that the exception is
inconsistent with the "principles of the common law."
A.

Shareholders' Right of Inspection

In establishing the "good cause" standard for piercing the attorney-client
privilege, Garner stated:
This approach is neither new nor world-shaking. At common law the stockholder has
the right to see corporate books and records but it is not unlimited. His demand must
be germane to his interest as stockholder, and the 76interests of the corporation and
other shareholders may control to deny inspection.

This analogy to the right of inspection is fundamentally misleading because it
implies that the analysis for finding "good cause" to pierce the attorney-client
privilege is substantially the same as that used in deciding whether a
shareholder can exercise the right of inspection. In drawing the analogy, the
court failed to recognize significant differences between these two
mechanisms for gaining information.
First, the analogy ignores the difference between the types of materials
generally available under the right of inspection and those which traditionally
have been protected by the attorney-client privilege. The right of inspection
usually involves corporate books, records, and lists of shareholders. 77 None
of these materials is created or preserved with the expectation of
confidentiality that surrounds communications seeking or containing legal
advice. 78 Moreover, since corporate records are not immune from civil
discovery (absent an independent privilege), 79 the right of inspection merely
accelerates a shareholder-plaintiffs access to unprivileged documents. A
derivative-claim exception to the attorney-client privilege should not be
created by reference to the right of inspection, which has as its object
materials that are not privileged.
The analogy to the right of inspection also fails to take account of the fact
that different policies underlie the right of inspection and the attorney-client
privilege.8 0 The right of inspection is based primarily on the shareholders'
74.

75.
(1971).
76.
77.

See id.

See Garner v. Wolfinbarger, 430 F.2d 1093, 1100-04 (5th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 974
Id. at 1104 n.21.
See H. HENN &J.

ALEXANDER, supra note 1, § 199, at 537-40.
78. See Note, The Attorney-Client Privilege-The Corporation in Shareholder Litigation, 50 S. CAL. L.
REv. 303, 320-21 (1977).
79. See generally Note, Discovery Against Corporations Under the Federal Rules, 47 IOWA L. REV. 1006

(1962).
80.

See Note, supia note 78, at 321.
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need for corporate information. 81 The attorney-client privilege, in contrast,
rests on the proposition that "the detriment ofjustice from the power to shut
off inquiry to pertinent facts in court

.

. .

will be out-weighed by the benefits

82
to justice (not to the client) from a franker disclosure in the lawyer's office."
Any exception to the attorney-client privilege should take account of the
policies that underlie the privilege, but the Garner analogy to the right of
inspection failed to recognize those policies.
Moreover, extending the right of inspection to privileged information
would subordinate the interests served by the attorney-client privilege to the
policies served by the right of inspection. Courts have traditionally refused to
do this. 8 3 With the exception of one district court decision, reversed on
appeal, no reported opinion has ever used the right of inspection to allow
shareholders access to privileged corporate documents.8 4 Thus, the Garner
analogy not only ignores the strong policy of encouraging frank attorneyclient communications, but, in so doing, also disregards the historical limits
upon the shareholders' right of inspection.

B.

The Joint-Client Exception to the Attorney-Client Privilege

The joint-client exception 8 5 to the attorney-client privilege is well
established.8 6 Wigmore formulated the exception in the following terms:
"when the same attorney acts for two parties having a common interest, and each
party communicates with him . . . [,] the communications . . . are not

privileged in a controversy between the original parties, inasmuch as the
common interest and employment forbade concealment by either from the
other." 87 McCormick explains the exception as follows:
In the first place the policy of encouraging disclosure by holding out the promise of
protection seems inapposite, since as between themselves neither would know
whether he would be more helped or handicapped, if in any dispute between them,
both could invoke the shield of secrecy. And secondly, it is said that they had
obviously no intention of keeping these secrets from
each other, and hence as between
88
themselves it was not intended to be confidential.

Both rationales rest on the assumption that joint clients intend that nothing
either says to their attorney will remain confidential from the other party.
The joint-client exception is consistent with, and can be explained in terms
of, the attorney-client privilege. The primary purpose of the privilege is to
encourage full and frank communication between client and counsel. 8 9 In the
typical joint-client case, two clients consult an attorney for their joint benefit.
81. See H. HENN &J. ALEXANDER, supra note 1, § 199, at 537.
82. C. MCCORMICK, supra note 41, § 87.
83. See In re LTV Sec. Litig., 89 F.R.D. 595, 611 (N.D. Tex. 1981) ("evidentiary privileges are
not subsidiary to shareholder's inspection rights").
84. See id. at 609-11.
85. Some commentators use the term "joint-attorney exception" instead of "joint-client
exception."
86. See C. MCCORMICK, supra note 41, § 91, at 217.
87. See 8 J. WIGMORE, supra note 10, § 2312, at 603-04 (emphasis in original).
88. See C. MCCORMICK, supra note 41, § 91, at 219.
89. See supra notes 40-43 and accompanying text.
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Because both are present during the consultation, disclosures made cannot be
intended to remain confidential as between the clients. 90 Although disclosure
to a third party normally waives the attorney-client privilege, the joint-client
exception allows the confidential communications requirement to be waived
as between the clients without requiring the clients to waive it with respect to
the rest of the world. 9 ' Being narrowly drawn, the joint-client exception does
not undermine full and frank communication between client and attorney.
In contrast to the prototypical joint-client situation, there is no joint
consultation involving the shareholders when corporate officials seek legal
advice. Only managers or board members disclose information and receive
advice. With respect to consultations in which they are not participants,
shareholders are akin to third parties. Consequently, the derivative-claim
exception, unlike the joint-client exception, undermines full and frank
communications between corporate clients and their attorneys. Corporate
officials are forced by the derivative-claim exception to choose between the
full and frank disclosure necessary to obtain the best possible legal advice and
disclosure which is less than full and frank in order to protect themselves from
derivative-suit plaintiffs. Thus, the policy considerations which support the
joint-client exception do not support a derivative-claim exception to the
attorney-client privilege.
C.

The Crime-Fraud Exception to the Attorney-Client Privilege

Although the attorney-client privilege has sometimes been viewed as a
shield for criminal or fraudulent activity, 9 2 the crime-fraud exception to the
privilege is well established. 93 This exception ensures that while attorneyclient communication after the client's commission of a crime or fraud are
privileged, communications that facilitate a future crime or fraud are not
94
privileged.
The crime-fraud exception is consistent with the purposes of the attorneyclient privilege. Since the privilege protects attorney-client communications
95
in order to promote the observance of law and the administration of justice,
it should not be used to facilitate illegal actions. The crime-fraud exception
thus allows the privilege to be pierced to prevent its abuse.
In Garner, the court used the crime-fraud exception to provide support by
analogy for a broad derivative-claim exception to the attorney-client privilege.
The court reasoned that "differences between prospective crime and
90. See, e.g., Hurlbert v. Hurlbert, 128 N.Y. 420, 28 N.E. 651 (1891). The joint-client exception
to the privilege depends upon a finding that both parties actually sought legal advice and that the
attorney in question actually did represent both clients. See, e.g., In re Colocotronis Tanker Sec.
Litig., 449 F. Supp. 828, 830-32 (S.D.N.Y. 1978). See generally 8J. WIGMORE, supra note 10, § 2312.
91. See 8J. WIGMORE, supra note 10, § 2312; cf In re International Sys. & Controls Corp. Sec.
Litig., 693 F.2d 1235, 1239 (5th Cir. 1981) (explaining the joint-client analogy as a fiction under
which shareholders constructively hire corporate counsel).
92. See, e.g., Valente v. Pepsico, Inc., 68 F.R.D. 361, 369-70 n.16 (D. Del. 1975).
93. See C. MCCORMICK, supra note 41, § 95.
94. See Proposed Fed. R. Evid. 503(d)(1).
95. See supra notes 64-68 and accompanying text.
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prospective action of questionable legality, or prospective fraud, are
96
differences of degree, not of principle."The argument that the crime-fraud and derivative-claim exceptions are
sufficiently similar to allow the former to support the latter by analogy ignores
the more basic question whether the derivative- claim exception is needed to
supplement the crime-fraud exception. One commentator, who notes that the
existing crime-fraud exception is too narrow to include, for example,
securities law violations that are merely negligently wrongful, argues that the
crime-fraud exception could be expanded to cover "all communications made
with the purpose of furthering an illegal, fraudulent, tortious, or otherwise
actionable activity" vis-a-vis the shareholders. 97 Such a modification of the
crime-fraud exception would be consistent with the trend toward expanding
the exception to include attorney-client communications used to facilitate
torts as well as crimes and frauds. 9 8 An expanded crime-fraud exception
would be preferable to the derivative-claim exception because it would be
clearly limited to prospective actions and would avoid introducing the
hodgepodge of factors which makes the derivative-claim exception difficult to
apply in a predictable fashion. 99

D.

Fiduciary-Duty Exception to the Attorney-Client Privilege

In Garner, the court emphasized that it was considering the attorney-client
privilege in "a particularized context: where the client asserting the privilege
is an entity which in the performance of its functions acts wholly or partly in
the interests of others, and those others, or some of them, seek access to the
subject matter of the communications." 0 0
[I]n assessing management assertions of injury to the corporation [from piercing the
privilege,] it must be borne in mind that management does not manage for itself and
that the beneficiaries of its action are the stockholders. Conceptualistic phrases
describing the corporation as an entity separate from its stockholders are not useful
tools of analysis. They serve only to obscure the fact that management has duties
which run to the benefit ultimately of the stockholders. For example, it is difficult to
rationally defend the assertion of the privilege if all, or substantially all, stockholders
desire to inquire into the attorney's communications with corporate representatives
who have only nominal ownership interests, or even none at all. There may be
reasonable differences over. . . the extent to which corporate management is less of a
fiduciary than the common law trustee. There may be many situations in which the
corporate entity or its management, or both, have interests adverse to those of some
or all stockholders. But when all is said and done management is not managing for
itself. l

The court recognized that the shareholders and management had a mutual
interest in management freely seeking legal advice when needed and putting
96.
(1971).
97.
98.
99.
100.
(1971).
101.

Garner v. Wolfinbarger, 430 F.2d 1093, 1103 (5th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 974
See Note, supra note 78, at 327, 329 (emphasis in original).
See, e.g., Pfizer, Inc. v. Lord, 456 F.2d 545, 549 (8th Cir. 1973).
See infra notes 140-202 and accompanying text.
Garner v. Wolfinbarger, 430 F.2d 1093, 1101 (5th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 974
Id. (footnotes omitted).
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it to use when received. Nonetheless, it concluded that management
judgment may not be shielded from shareholders by an "ironclad veil of
secrecy."' 0 2 The court accordingly rejected the argument that, in the long
run, a fully protected privilege would benefit the shareholders more than
03
would a derivative-claim exception.'
In emphasizing the uniqueness of the relationship between management
and shareholders, Garner addressed three concerns: (1) the shareholders'
proprietary interest in the attorney's advice; (2) a mutuality of interest
between shareholders and management in using legal advice in the best
interests of the corporation as a whole; and (3) the fiduciary relationship
which exists between corporate officials and shareholders.' 0 4 In combination,
these three concerns provide the most persuasive argument for the
recognition of a derivative-claim exception. The argument is that the
shareholders, rather than corporate officials, are paying for the attorney;
therefore, the attorney's advice belongs to the shareholders. Those
shareholders, in a derivative suit, seek to use the confidential legal
communications for the benefit of the corporation. This argument concludes
that the duty of loyalty owed by management to the shareholders supports an
exception to the attorney-client privilege.
1. Shareholders' proprietary interest in the attorney's advice. In support of a
derivative-claim exception to the attorney-client privilege, Garner emphasized
that management might have only "nominal ownership interests, or even
none at all" in the corporation. 10 5 One implication from this observation is
that legal advice given by a corporation's attorney belongs to the shareholderowners.
Other relationships, such as those between clients and accountants, are no
less proprietary than the attorney-client relationship, but only independent
statutory authority-and not the mere presence of a proprietary
relationship-extends a privilege to communications made in the course of
those relationships. 10 6 Moreover, a proprietary notion of the attorney-client
privilege could lead to absurd results, as in a civil action against the
government in which the citizen-plaintiff would seek to pierce the privilege
which exists between executive branch officials and their attorneys on the
theory that the citizen has paid taxes and thus has a proprietary interest in any'
advice rendered. In reality, the attorney-client privilege is based not on
protecting a proprietary interest, but rather on the theory that promoting
confidential communications between client and attorney furthers the ends of
justice. 10 7 Again, any new exception to the attorney-client privilege should
102.
103.
104.
105.
(1971).

Id.
See id. at 1102.
See infra notes 105-20 and accompanying text.
Garner v. Wolfinbarger, 430 F.2d 1093. 1101 (5th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 974

106.

See 8 J. WIGMORE. supra note 10, § 2286.

107.

See supra note 43 and accompanying text.
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take account of the purpose of the privilege and not simply refer to extrinsic
notions such as protecting a proprietary interest.
2. Mutuality of interest in the use of advicefor the benefit of the corporation. Garner
recognized that corporate officials and shareholders have a "mutuality of
interest" in management's "freely seeking advice when needed and putting it
to use when received," but concluded that the "mutuality of interest" did not
warrant management's erecting an "ironclad veil of secrecy."' 0 8 The
'mutuality of interest" presumably refers to the common interest of the
shareholders and management in doing what is best for the corporation.
When derivative suit plaintiffs seek to pierce the attorney-client privilege, they
argue that they are acting for the benefit of the corporation. 0 9 This
argument, by focusing on the short-term benefit to the corporation,
undervalues long-term adverse effects caused by the vitiation of the corporate
attorney-client privilege.
As amicus curiae in Garner, the American Bar Association (ABA) argued
that the benefits flowing to the corporation from an exception to the privilege
would be outweighed by the harm which would be done to both the corporate
client and its attorney.' 1l The ABA emphasized that there was a direct
relationship between the protection of the privilege and the quality of the
advice provided by the attorney. The court rejected this argument and
presumed that an exception to the privilege would not affect the quality of
advice provided by the attorney. The court also presumed that a derivativeclaim exception would not affect the willingness of corporate officials fully to
disclose potentially inculpatory information to their attorney, since they were
under a duty to do so."' By failing to recognize that the scope of the
privilege might well affect both the willingness of a client to make a full
disclosure and the ability of counsel to offer informed advice (legal
obligations notwithstanding), the court ignored the long-term harm to the
corporation and its shareholders that would result from a derivative-claim
exception.
3. Fiduciary relationship between management and shareholders. In Garner, the
court emphasized that "management has duties which run to the benefit
ultimately of the stockholders." ' "1 2 While recognizing that "corporate
management is less of a fiduciary than the common law trustee," the court did
not adequately distinguish between the two relationships and concluded
simply that "when all is said and done management is not managing for
itself."' 13
108.

Garner v. Wolfinbarger, 430 F.2d 1093, 1101 (5th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 974

(1971).
109.

See id. at 1103.

110.

See id.at 1102.

111.
112.

Id. Contra Upjohn Co. v. United States, 449 U.S. 383, 392 (1981).
Garner v. Wolfinbarger, 430 F.2d 1093, 1101 (5th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 974

(1971).
113.

Id.
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The court's focus on fiduciary relationships ignores the differences
between the management's relationship to the shareholder and the trustee's
relationship to the beneficiary. A shareholder is not in as complete a state of
dependence as the beneficiary of a trust because the shareholder is almost
always in a better position to protect his interest. The shareholder-unlike
the trust beneficiary, who is generally a donee without authority to manage
the trust corpus-is an investor who can usually sell his stock."14 The
fiduciary duty analogy thus assumes that the shareholder is more vulnerable
than he generally is in fact.
Even if corporate officials are characterized as fiduciaries, an exception to
the attorney-client privilege based upon the existence of a fiduciary duty is
inconsistent with the purposes of the privilege. The attorney-client privilege
rests on the proposition that the detriment to justice from denying access to
relevant information is outweighed by the benefits to justice from a full and
frank disclosure in the lawyer's office.' 15 Corporate officials-especially those
who would like both to obey the law and to minimize legal liability-are less
likely to discuss their legal problems with counsel if the communications can
later be used against them in a derivative suit." t 6

Since an incompletely

informed attorney is less able to encourage compliance with the law, an
exception to the privilege based on extrinsic concerns, such as the existence
of a fiduciary duty, is contrary to sound policy.
Moreover, basing the derivative-claim exception on the existence of a
fiduciary duty poses a dangerous precedent by tapping judicial receptivity to
the creation of a new exception wherever a fiduciary duty is thought to exist.
In the years following Garner, courts have explicitly relied on its logic and
created fiduciary-based exceptions to the attorney-client privilege: allowing
shareholders in a target company to pierce the privilege of the acquiring
company;" 17 allowing minority shareholders to pierce the privilege of another
corporation which was the majority shareholder in the plaintiffs'
corporation;" 18 allowing debenture holders to pierce the corporate
privilege;" l9 allowing a defendant to pierce the privilege of the plaintiffshareholder; 120 and allowing the Secretary of Labor to pierce the privilege
held by the trustees of a union pension fund.12i These extensions of the
derivative-claim exception to other fiduciary situations chill attorney-client
114. See Note, supra note 78, at 318-19; G. BOGERT, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TRUSTS § 93, at
337 (5th ed. 1973).
Shareholders in a close corporation may warrant special protection because no ready market
exists for their shares. See H. HENN &J. ALEXANDER, supra note 1, §§ 257, 268, 276.
115. C. MCCORMICK, supra note 41, § 87.
116. See supra notes 47-55 and accompanying text.
117. Bailey v. Meister Brau, Inc., 55 F.R.D. 211, 213-14 (N.D. Ill. 1972).
118. Valente v. Pepsico, Inc., 68 F.R.D. 361, 367-68 (D. Del. 1975).
119. Broad v. Rockwell Int'l Corp., [1976-1977 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH)
95,894 (N.D. Tex. 1977).
120. George v. LeBlanc, 78 F.R.D. 281, 289-90 (N.D. Tex. 1977).
121. Donovan v. Fitzsimmons, 90 F.R.D. 583, 586 (N.D. Ill. 1981).
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communications both when the exception is thought to apply and even more
perniciously when its applicability is uncertain.
V
THE GOOD-CAUSE STANDARD:

AN INVITATION TO INCONSISTENCY

Garner v. Wolfinbarger' 22 established the principle that even when the
attorney-client privilege would prevent the discovery of confidential
communications between corporate officials and their attorneys in a
nonderivative suit, shareholder-plaintiffs in a derivative action could show
"good cause" why the privilege should not be invoked against them. Garner
set forth nine factors which indicate whether good cause has been established
in a particular case.' 2 3 The inherent complexity and manipulability of a ninefactor test, however, make it difficult to predict whether good cause to pierce
the privilege surrounding any particular attorney-client communication might
later be found. Uncertainty in the application of the derivative-claim
exception undermines the expectations of confidentiality which the attorney124
client privilege was designed to protect.
A.

The Need for a Test Which Produces Predictable Results: Upjohn Co. v.
United States 125

An important function of the attorney-client privilege in the corporate
context is the facilitation of communication of all relevant information to the
attorney so that he will be able to render legal advice to the corporate
client. 12 " This function requires that attorney and client be able to predict
with some degree of certainty whether particular discussions will be
protected.' 2 7 In Upjohn, the Supreme Court rejected the "control group"
test, which extended the attorney-client privilege only to those corporate
officers who played a "substantial role" in deciding and directing a
corporation's legal response. The Court noted that almost identical factual
patterns produced opposite results when the "control group" test was applied
and stated that an "uncertain privilege, or one which purports to be certain
but results in widely varying applications by the courts, is little better than no
'l privilege at all.'
B.

Unresolved Issues in Applying the Good-Cause Test

The "control group" test was rejected by the Supreme Court in Upjohn in
part because it left attorney and client unable to predict with certainty
122.

430 F.2d 1093 (5th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 974 (1971).

123.
121.

Id.
See mj/ia notes 125-202 and accompanying text.

125.
126.

449 U.S. 383 (1981).
Id. at 392. For a discussion of the purposes of the privilege, see supra notes 34-72 and

iug (eXt.
a(. mtnpaylh!
1p oht. 449 U.S. at 393.
127.
128. Id.
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whether particular discussions would be privileged. In comparison, the Garner
derivative-claim exception is even more objectionable. The circumstances in
which the exception applies are unclear. This difficulty is aggravated by the
complexity and manipulability of the nine-factor good-cause test. 129
The derivative-claim exception would clearly apply in a pure derivative
action in which the shareholder-plaintiff brings suit only on behalf of the
corporation and not also on behalf of himself or a class of shareholders of
which he is a member.' 30 Beyond the pure derivative action, however, it is
unclear when good cause may be shown to pierce the attorney-client privilege.
While the derivative-claim exception originated in Garner, which involved
class as well as derivative-claimsIs the district court in Ohio-Sealy M1attress
Manufacturing Co. v. Kaplan 132 refused to pierce the privilege in favor of
shareholders who made both derivative and direct claims, because any
information obtained in plaintiffs' role as derivative representatives could also
be used to the corporation's detriment in the nonderivative causes of
action.' 33 Thus, the court in Ohio-Sealy used one of the Garner arguments in
favor of the derivative-claim exception-that derivative suit plaintiffs should
be allowed to pierce the privilege since they act for the benefit of the
corporationI 34-to limit the exception to pure derivative suits, even though
the facts in Garner demonstrate that the exception was intended to apply to
35
mixed derivative-class actions.'
After Ohio-Sealy, the Fifth Circuit reaffirmed its decision in Garner and
applied the derivative-claim exception to an action that combined derivative
and class claims.1 36 Faced with conflicting court opinions, attorneys and
clients should assume that their communications will not be privileged from
discovery by mixed derivative-class action plaintiffs. As the Supreme Court
recognized in Upjohn, however, an uncertain privilege is little better than no
13 7
privilege at all.
While the court in Ohio-Sealy used a policy argument to narrow the

derivative-claim exception, policy arguments have more often been used to
expand the exception. For example, some courts have focused on the
fiduciary relationship discussion in Garner and used the good-cause test to
pierce the attorney-client privilege in contexts other than the derivative
129. See infra notes 139-45 and accompanying text.
130. See Kirby, New Life for the CorporateAttorney-Client Privilege, 69 A.B.A.J. 74, 176 (1983).
131. Garner v. Wollinbarger, 430 F.2d 1093 (5th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 974 (1971).
1980).
132. 90 F.R.D. 21, 32 (N.D. Ill.
133. Id.; see also Weil v. Investment/Indicators Research & Mgt., 647 F.2d 18, 23 (9th Cir. 1981).
Compare Kirby, supra note 130, at 176 (I1'eil effectively limited Garner to derivative actions) with Lewis,
The Availability of the Attorney-Client and Work-Product Privileges in Shareholder Litigation, 32 CLEV. ST. L.
REV. 189, 204 (1984) (since 1Veil involved a direct claim of dubious merit by a single shareholder, the
decision cannot be construed to be dispositive in all nonderivative suits).
134. See supra notes 108-09 and accompanying text.
135. Garner, 430 F.2d at 1095.
136. In re International Sys. & Controls Corp. Sec. Litig., 693 F.2d 1235, 1239 n.3 (5th Cir.
1982).
137. Upjohn Co. v. United States, 449 U.S. 383, 393 (1981).
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suit. 13 8 Such ex post facto expansions of the derivative-claim exception are

especially objectionable because they violate expectations regarding which
attorney-client communications are privileged.
Another reason why corporate attorneys and their clients cannot reliably
predict whether their communications will be privileged from discovery by
shareholder-plaintiffs is that the inherent complexity of the good-cause test
makes it difficult to apply and easy to manipulate. To determine whether
good cause to pierce the attorney-client privilege has been established in a
particular shareholder action, Garner proposed a nine-factor test, the elements
of which were not weighted.

39

Although the court indicated that its list of nine factors was not
exhaustive,140 subsequent decisions have treated the nine factors as the
conclusive test for determining when the derivative-claim exception to the
privilege should be recognized.' 4 1 While the as-yet-unused option to
consider additional factors adds another element of uncertainty to the
privilege, the nine already enunciated factors have proved impossible to apply
in any predictable fashion.
Fifteen years after Garner, the courts have not reached a consensus on how
much weight should be attributed to each of the nine elements of good cause.
For example, one court has given determinative weight to whether the
communication concerned past or prospective conduct, 14 2 while another
court did not consider that factor to be of great significance. 43 Similarly,
some courts have stated that the determinative factor is the plaintiff's need for
the sought-after information, 4 4 while other courts have not considered that
factor to be of special importance. 4 5 The varying weights given each factor
suggest that the good-cause test provides little guidance to the courts or,
worse, that the test is subject to manipulation by result-oriented courts that fix
upon the factor which best supports the desired outcome. Moreover, the
unpredictable weights given each element offer no guidance to attorney and
client in assessing whether a particular conversation will be privileged.
C.

The Elements of Good Cause

Not only is the nine-factor good-cause test too complex to apply in a
principled and consistent fashion, 14 6 but the individual factors are ill-defined
and attempt to accomplish too many diverse objectives, most of which are
extrinsic to the purposes of the attorney-client privilege. The derivative-claim
138. See supra notes 116-20 and accompanying text.
139. See Garner, 430 F.2d at 1104; see also In re LTV Sec. Litig., 89 F.R.D. 595, 606 (N.D. Tex.
1981) (noting that Garner "did not direct how these [nine] factors should be evaluated.").
140. See Garner, 430 F.2d at 1104.
141. See, e.g., George v. LeBlanc, 78 F.R.D. 281, 290 (N.D. Tex. 1977) (describing the nine
factors as the "Wolfinbarger test").
142. Ohio-Sealy Mattress Mfg. Co. v. Kaplan, 90 F.R.D. 21, 31 (N.D. Ill. 1980).
143. In re Transocean Tender Offer Sec. Litig., 78 F.R.D. 692, 697 (N.D. Ill. 1978).
144. See, e.g., In re LTV Sec. Litig., 89 F.R.D. 595, 608 (N.D. Tex. 1981).
145. See, e.g., Ohio-Sealy Mattress Mfg. Co. v. Kaplan, 90 F.R.D. 21, 31-32 (N.D. Ill. 1980).
146. See supra notes 142-45 and accompanying text.
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exception undermines the privilege unnecessarily, because most of the goals
that the complex good-cause test seeks to accommodate are already provided
for by other exceptions to the privilege or substantive corporate law.
The first element in the Garner good-cause test is the number of plaintiffshareholders and the percentage of stock which they represent. 4 7 The court
gave no indication of how many plaintiff-shareholders or what percentage of
stock is necessary for this factor to weigh in favor of piercing the privilege,
and no consensus has emerged on this point. Not surprisingly, courts have
pointed to the joinder of only tiny minorities of shareholders as plaintiffs
when upholding the privilege.' 48 Similarly, it is not surprising that courts
have noted the joinder of overwhelming majorities of shareholders as
plaintiffs to justify piercing the privilege. 49 One court even suggested that
substantial unanimity among shareholders would be decisive, thus collapsing
the good-cause test into a single-factor test.' 5 0 That court also hinted that
good cause could be found even though the class inquiring into the privileged
communications was not comprised of a majority of the shareholders. 15 1
Other courts have avoided the issue, simply noting the joinder of an
unspecified but "substantial number" of shareholders as plaintiffs in support
52
of decisions to pierce the privilege.
As with the other eight elements of the good-cause test, Garner did not
explain why the number of shareholders is relevant to the inquiry into the
existence of good cause. 153 Presumably, this indicator of good cause reflects
the court's view that corporate management owes fiduciary duties to both
suing and nonsuing shareholders. 54 Since the corporation is "vulnerable to
suit by shareholders whose interests or intentions may be inconsistent with
those of other shareholders,"'' 55 considering the number of plaintiffshareholders when deciding whether to pierce the privilege may deter strike
suits or other suits inconsistent with the larger corporate interest. 5 6 The
deterrence of strike suits or of other suits inconsistent with the corporate
interest, however, is a purpose extrinsic to the attorney-client privilege. Not
only is the number of plaintiffs wholly unrelated to the functions of the

privilege, but this element of the good-cause test undermines predictability
147. Garner v. Wolfinbarger, 430 F.2d 1093, 1104 (5th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 974
(1971). Saltzburg, supra note 2, at 832, asks why the number of shareholders or the percentage of
stock should matter at all.
148. See e.g.,
Ohio-Sealy Mattress Mfg. Co. v. Kaplan, 90 F.R.D. 21, 31-32 (N.D. Il. 1980); see also
Valente v. Pepsico, Inc., 68 F.R.D. 361, 370 (D. Del. 1975) (no good cause would exist where "the
interests of the great majority of the beneficiaries would be better served by the privilege").
149. See, e.g., Panter v. Marshall Field & Co., 80 F.R.D. 718, 723 (N.D. Ill. 1978).
150. Cohen v. Uniroyal, Inc., 80 F.R.D. 480, 484 n.4 (E.D. Pa. 1978). The court erred in
ascribing this position to Garner. See id.
151. Id. at 484 n.4.
152. See, e.g., In re Transocean Tender Offer Litig., 78 F.R.D. 692, 696 (N.D. Ill.
1978); Broad v.
Rockwell Int'l Corp., [1976-1977 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH)
95,894, at 91,304
(N.D. Tex. 1977).
153. See Garner, 430 F.2d at 1104.
154. See id.at 1101; accord In re LTV Sec. Litig., 89 F.R.D. 595, 606-07 (N.D. Tex. 1981).
155. Garner, 430 F.2d at 1101 n.17.
156. See In re LTV Sec. Litig., 89 F.R.D. 595, 606-07 (N.D. Tex. 1981).

LAW AND CONTEMPORARY

PROBLEMS

[Vol. 48: No. 3

because an attorney and client cannot foresee the number of putative
15 7
plaintiffs at the time legal advice is sought or given.
The second factor in the Garner good-cause analysis is the bona fides, or
good faith, of the plaintiff-shareholders.15 Although sometimes mentioned
by courts in support of decisions to pierce the privilege, 59 this factor has
never been determinative. On the other hand, the absence of good faith
would indicate a strike suit and would likely be an important factor in a
decision not to pierce the privilege. 60 Since bad faith is more important in
deciding to uphold the privilege than is good faith in deciding to pierce it, this
element of the good-cause test would seem to support a stronger privilege.
Because good faith is but one element in an unweighted balancing test,
however, courts can use the plaintiffs' bona fides to offset another element of
the test less favorable to their cause. Moreover, the second element of the
good-cause test, like the first, accomplishes its deterrent function in a way that
does not take account of the purposes of the attorney-client privilege and
tends to undermine predictability because it is impossible to foresee the good
faith of potential plaintiffs at the time legal advice is sought.
The third factor to consider under the Garner good-cause analysis is the
6
nature of the shareholders' claim and whether it is obviously colorable.' '
This factor, like the previous two, seems to reflect a concern for preventing
strike suits.' 6 2 While the presence of a colorable claim has been mentioned in
several decisions finding good cause to pierce the privilege, it has always been
163
buried in a list of supporting factors and has never seemed decisive.
Furthermore, this factor has never been cited in support of a decision to deny
discovery, probably because the usual remedy for failure to state a colorable
claim is a motion to dismiss.'6 Although it has proved to be of little
independent significance, the colorability element undermines the attorneyclient privilege in the same manner as does the good faith factor: by
potentially offsetting another element of the good-cause test less favorable to
the plaintiff, and by being incapable of prediction at the time legal advice is
sought.
While screening out strike suits may be a worthwhile objective, the first
three elements of the good-cause test do so at too great a cost to a viable
157. See Note, supra note 78, at 322.
158. Garner, 430 F.2d at 1104. Saltzburg, supra note 2, at 832, comments that it is "difficult to
understand how [bona fides] is to be determined."
159. See, e.g., Donovan v. Fitzsimmons, 90 F.R.D. 583, 587 (N.D. I1. 1981); Cohen v. Uniroyal,
Inc., 80 F.R.D. 480, 484 (E.D. Pa. 1978).
160. See In re International Sys. & Controls Corp. Sec. Litig., 91 F.R.D. 552, 558 (S.D. Tex.
1981), vacated on other grounds, 693 F.2d 1235 (5th Cir. 1982); Valente v. Pepsico, Inc., 68 F.R.D. 361,
370 (D. Del. 1975).
161. Garner, 430 F.2d at 1104. Saltzburg, supra note 2, at 833, questions whether a court can
evaluate degrees of colorability.
162. See In re International Sys. & Controls Corp. Sec. Litig., 91 F.R.D. 552, 558 (S.D. Tex.
1981), vacated on other grounda, 693 F.2d 1235 (5th Cir. 1982).
163. See, e.g., Donovan v. Fitzsimmons, 90 F.R.D. 583, 587 (N.D. Ill. 1981); In re Transocean
Tender Offer Litig., 78 F.R.D. 692, 696 (N.D. Ill. 1978).
164. See FED. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6).
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attorney-client privilege. Problems such as strike suits can be governed and
remedied by substantive corporate law. Those elements of the good-cause
test aimed at deterring strike suits-the number of shareholder-plaintiffs,
their bona fides, and the colorability of their claims-may all be considered by
a corporate board, a special litigation committee, or a court (after a demand
for action on the corporation has been made or excused).1 6 5 Likewise,
statutes already exist to deter strike suits 16 6 and could be amended if

inadequate. There is thus no need to weaken the attorney-client privilege to
deter strike suits.
The fourth element of the good-cause test is the apparent necessity or
desirability of shareholders having the privileged information and the
availability of the information from other sources. 16 7 The absence of
alternative sources of information has been cited in support of piercing the
attorney-client privilege,16 8 and one court has suggested that the existence of
alternative sources of information would be a decisive factor in refusing to
pierce the privilege. 169 When the desired information is available from other
sources, the plaintiff who is denied privileged information is no worse off than
if the corporation had never consulted counsel. Merely easing the burden of
discovery for the plaintiff does not so benefit the fair and efficient processing
of litigation as to outweigh the corporation's need to consult with its attorney
in confidence.' 70 While an argument can be made that a plaintiff who alleges
fraud and who consequently must prove scienter demonstrates a substantial
need for privileged information, 17' the preexisting common law crime-fraud
exception allows a plaintiff to pierce the privilege only when it is used to
further illegal activity.' 72 Since the attorney-client privilege rests on the
proposition that "the detriment to justice from the power to shut off inquiry
into pertinent factors in court . . . will be outweighed by the benefits to
justice . . . from a franker disclosure in the lawyer's office,"' 73 the long-term

interests of justice mandate that absent an exception such as that for
165. See generally Zapata Corp. v. Maldonado, 430 A.2d 779, 784 (Del. 1981) (board's decision to
dismiss derivative suit as detrimental to the corporation's interests will be respected unless decision
found not to be made independently, in good faith, and with reasonable basis).
166. See, e.g., FED. R. Civ. P. 23.1; N.Y. Bus. CORP. LAW § 626 (McKinney 1963); MODEL
BuSINESS CORP. ACT § 49 (1953).
167. Garner,430 F.2d at 1104. Saltzburg, supra note 2, at 833, suggests that this factor begs the
question.
168. See, e.g., Panter v. Marshall Field & Co., 80 F.R.D. 718, (N.D. Ill. 1978); Cohen v. Uniroyal,
Inc., 80 F.R.D. 480, 484 (E.D. Pa. 1978); In re Transocean Tender Offer Litig., 78 F.R.D. 692, 696
(N.D. II1. 1978); Bailey v. Meister Brau, Inc., 55 F.R.D. 211, 214 (N.D. Ill. 1972).

169.

In re LTV Sec. Litig., 89 F.R.D. 595, 608 (N.D. Tex. 1981).

170. Id. at 609-10; see also Upjohn Co. v. United States, 449 U.S. 383, 396 (1981)
("considerations of convenience do not overcome the policies served by the attorney-client

privilege").
171. See In re International Sys. & Controls Corp. Sec. Litig., 91 F.R.D. 552, 559 (S.D. Tex.
1981), vacated on other grounds, 693 F.2d 1235 (5th Cir. 1982); Cohen v. Uniroyal, Inc., 80 F.R.D. 480,
484 (E.D. Pa. 1978); Lewis, supra note 133, at 209.
172.
173.

See supra notes 92-99 and accompanying text.
C. MCCORMICK, supra note 41, § 87.
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prospective crimes and frauds, a plaintiff should not be allowed to pierce the
privilege even on a showing of substantial need.
The apparent-necessity-or-desirability standard enunciated in Garner has
not traditionally been considered as a justification for piercing the attorney74
client privilege; rather, it is borrowed from the work-product exception.'
The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provide that work product may, in
general, be discovered upon a showing of substantial need and undue
hardship. 175 The Rules also provide, however: "In ordering discovery of such
materials when the required showing has been made, the court shall protect
against disclosure of the mental impressions, conclusions, opinions, or legal
theories of an attorney or other representative of a party concerning the
litigation."'' 76 In other words, only factual work product may be discovered
upon a showing of substantial need and undue hardship. 77 Since the
required showing applies only to factual work product, and since underlying
facts are not protected by the attorney-client privilege, 178 Garner's use of a
borrowed work-product standard is inappropriate to the decision whether to
pierce the attorney-client privilege.
A fifth element of the Garner good-cause analysis is the extent to which the
desired communication is identified versus the extent to which the
shareholders are blindly "fishing."' 79 While often cited-though without
special weight-among the list of factors supporting a decision to pierce the
privilege,' 80 this factor has not been used in a reported case to support a
finding of lack of good cause. Indeed, the very possibility that the identifiedcommunication/blindly-fishing factor might ever be used to bar discovery of
privileged information has been vitiated by repeated holdings that this factor
imposes no higher standard of relevance than that required by the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure. 18 ' Since Rule 26(b)(1) allows the discovery of any
information that is either admissible or reasonably calculated to lead to the
discovery of admissible evidence,' 82 and since the good-cause test defines a
"fishing expedition" in terms of Rule 26 irrelevance, this element of the
Garner analysis can weigh against the discovery of privileged information only
if that information would not be discoverable absent any privilege!
174.
175.

See FED. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(3).
Id.

176.

Id.

177. See Upjohn, 449 U.S. at 400 ("The Rule permits disclosure of documents and tangible
things.").
178. Id. at 395.
179. Garner, 430 F.2d at 1104. Saltzburg, supra note 2, at 834, doubts the clarity of a rule that
fishing expeditions be avoided.
180. See, e.g., Broad v. Rockwell Int'l Corp., [1976-1977 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP.
(CCH) 95,894 (N.D. Tex. 1977); Bailey v. Meister Brau, Inc., 55 F.R.D. 211, 214 (N.D. Ill. 1972).
181. See Panter v. Marshall Field & Co., 80 F.R.D. 718, 723 (N.D. Il. 1978); Cohen v. Uniroyal,
Inc., 80 F.R.D. 480, 484 (E.D. Pa. 1978); In re Transocean Tender Offer Litig., 78 F.R.D. 692, 697
(N.D. Tex. 1978); Broad v. Rockwell Int'l Corp., [1976-1977 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP.
(CCH) 95,894 (N.D. Tex. 1977).
182. FED. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(1).
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The risk that trade secrets will be divulged is a sixth factor of the goodcause analysis.' 8 3 Although the absence of any trade secrets is frequently
84
cited among a list of factors supporting a decision to pierce the privilege,
this factor, like the identified-communication/blindly-fishing factor, has not
been used to support a finding of lack of good cause and is unnecessary in any
respect. While apparently designed to protect trade secrets from discovery,
this factor provides no independent protection; whether or not the attorneyclient privilege is pierced, trade secrets are protected on independent
grounds under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. 8 5 Although this factor
does not provide additional protection for trade secrets, it undermines the
attorney-client privilege; the fact that the sought-after materials do not
contain trade secrets is used to pierce a privilege, but the purpose of the
privilege is wholly unrelated to the protection of trade secrets.
A seventh factor under the Garner analysis is whether the conduct
18 6
complained of is criminal, illegal but not criminal, or of doubtful legality.

This factor serves a useful purpose only to the extent that it would support
piercing the attorney-client privilege in cases in which the traditional crimefraud exception would not do so.

18 7

At first glance this Garner factor seems

broader than the traditional crime-fraud exception because, unlike the
traditional exception, it is not limited to communications made during or
188
before the commission of a crime or fraud that assists in its commission.
The good-cause analysis, however, has sometimes been interpreted to bar the
disclosure of post-event legal communications, 189 and there has been a trend
toward expanding the crime-fraud exception to include attorney-client
communications that facilitate other torts as well as crimes or frauds.190 Thus,
the crime-fraud exception and this Garner factor appear to be converging,
making the latter duplicative. To the extent that the crime-fraud exception
does not yet include legal communications facilitating corporate torts, the
traditional exception could be expanded. A modified crime-fraud exception
would be preferable to the derivative-claim exception because the former
could be clearly limited to legal advice concerning prospective misdeeds, 191 and
because it would be a single-factor test which could be predictably applied.
Whether the sought-after communications relate to past or prospective
corporate actions is the eighth factor under the good-cause analysis. 19 2 Since
183. Garner, 430 F.2d at 1104. Saltzburg, supra note 2, at 834, wonders why trade secrets are
weighed in the balance instead of being treated separately.
184. See, e.g., In re Transocean Tender Offer Litig., 78 F.R.D. 692, 697 (N.D. Ill. 1978); Valente
v. Pepsico, Inc., 68 F.R.D. 361, 370 (D. Del. 1975).
185. See FED. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(7).
186. Garner, 430 F.2d at 1104.
187. The same point is made by Saltzburg, supra note 2, at 833. For a discussion of the crimefraud exception, see supra notes 94-99 and accompanying text.
188. See Garner, 430 F.2d at 1102, 1104; see also Proposed Fed. R. Evid. 503(d)(1).
189. See In re LTV Sec. Litig., 89 F.R.D. 595, 607-08 (N.D. Tex. 1981). But see Lewis, supra note
133, at 200.
190. See, e.g., Pfizer, Inc. v. Lord, 456 F.2d 454, 459 (8th Cir. 1972).
191. On limitation to prospective misdeeds, see infra notes 192-96 and accompanying text.
192. Garner, 430 F.2d at 1104.
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the attorney-client privilege shields legal communications in order to promote
observance of the law and the administration ofjustice, 19 3 use of the privilege
to facilitate prospective violations of the law constitutes an abuse of the
privilege which should not be permitted. 94 On the other hand, legal
communications concerning past events should be privileged because (1) the
privilege's purpose is served by corporate self-investigation, and (2) the
corporate interest and the plaintiff-shareholders' interests diverge at the time
the wrongdoing ends. 19 5 Although the past-or-prospective-action element
draws a bright line which can be foreseen at the time legal advice is sought, it
duplicates the traditional crime-fraud exception by protecting post-event
communications from discovery, while withholding protection from legal
communications used to further future wrongdoing.1 96
The final element of the Garner analysis is whether the sought-after
communication is advice concerning the litigation itself.' 9 7 This element of
the good-cause test borrows from the definition of work product as materials
"prepared in anticipation of litigation." 198 Although no court has found good
cause to pierce the attorney-client privilege in favor of plaintiffs seeking
disclosure of legal advice offered in connection with the litigation itself,' 99 the
question remains whether a work-product standard should be used to allow
discovery of attorney-client communications which would ordinarily be
privileged even though they did not occur in connection with the litigation
itself. The limitation of work product to materials prepared in anticipation of
litigation "serves to formalize a principle upon which nearly all courts have
agreed: that protected work product does not include materials prepared in
the ordinary course of business, which material is discoverable regardless of
whether or not prepared by an attorney." 20 0 This limitation is necessary in
the work-product context because the work-product privilege extends to all
documents and tangible items prepared by or for a party, the party's attorney,
or their agents. 20 ' In contrast, the attorney-client privilege is narrower,
shielding only legal communications from discovery. 20 2 Thus, although the
193.
194.

See Upjohn Co. v. United States, 449 U.S. 383, 389 (1981).
One aberrant court found support for a decision not to pierce the attorney-client privilege

from the fact that the specified communication pertained to prospective action. Ohio-Sealy Mattress
Mfg. Co. v. Kaplan, 90 F.R.D. 21, 31 (N.D. Ill.
1980).
195. In re LTV Sec. Litig., 89 F.R.D. 595, 608 (N.D. Tex. 1981); see also Panter v. Marshall Field
& Co., 80 F.R.D. 718, 723-24 (N.D. Ill. 1978) (allowing discovery of advice contemporaneous with
challenged conduct); Cohen v. Uniroyal, Inc., 80 F.R.D. 480, 485 (E.D. Pa. 1978) (allowing discovery
of advice antedating challenged conduct).
196. On the distinction between past and prospective action under the traditional crime-fraud
exception, see supra notes 92-95 and accompanying text. Saltzburg, supra note 2,at 833, questions "a
special distinction between past and prospective actions in shareholder suits, when there is no such

distinction in any other suits."
197.
198.
199.
Marshall

Garner, 430 F.2d at 1104.
See FED. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(3).
Cf Ohio-Sealy Mattress Mfg. Co. v. Kaplan, 90 F.R.D. 21, 31 (N.D. Ill. 1980); Panter v.
Field & Co., 80 F.R.D. 718, 724 (N.D. Ill. 1978).
200. S. STONE & R. LIEBMAN, TESTIMONIAL PRIVILEGES § 2.07, at 158 (1983) (citations omitted).

201.

See id. § 2.05.

202.

See Upjohn, 449 U.S. at 393, 395.
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the
undermine
does
not
standard
concerning-the-litigation-itself
predictability of the attorney-client privilege (because it is usually possible to
know whether advice concerns the litigation at the time it is sought), what is
essentially a work-product standard should not be used to narrow further the
already narrow attorney-client privilege.
VI
CONCLUSION

The Garner derivative-claim exception unnecessarily undermines the
attorney-client privilege by seeking to accomplish a hodgepodge of extrinsic
objectives, most of which are already provided for by preexisting exceptions
to the privilege or by substantive corporate law. Moreover, the complexity of
the Garner test as a whole, as well as the nature of many of its nine elements,
makes it difficult to predict whether particular legal advice will remain
privileged from shareholder-plaintiffs.
In many areas of the law the cost of leaving issues unresolved is less than
the benefit obtained by allowing lower courts to experiment with and develop
new approaches to a problem. 20 3 Such uncertainty is impermissible in the
area of the attorney-client privilege, however, where the goal of full and frank
communications depends upon knowing with certainty which discussions will
be shielded from discovery. 20 4 As the Supreme Court made clear 20in5 Upjohn,
an uncertain privilege is worth little more than no privilege at all.
Finally, "[i]n light of the vast and complicated array of regulatory
legislation confronting the modern corporation, corporations, unlike most
individuals, 'constantly go to lawyers to find out how to obey the law.' -206
The uncertain and weakened privilege engendered by the derivative-claim
exception chills the open communication with attorneys that is necessary to
maximize voluntary compliance with the law. Thus, the attempt in Garner to
better protect shareholders from corporate wrongdoing may actually be
counterproductive, making it more difficult for the corporation to clean its
own house and thereby fulfill its duties to its shareholders.

203.

204.
205.
206.
901, 913

See generally B. CARDOZO, THE GROWTH OF THE LAW (1924).

See Upjohn Co. v. United States, 449 U.S. 383, 392 (1981).
See id. at 393.
Id. at 392 (quoting Burnham, The Attorney-Client Privilege in the CorporateArena, 24 Bus. LAw.
(1969)).

